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Abstract—In this paper, we propose a protocol that preserves
(statistical) privacy of agents’ costs in peer-to-peer distributed
optimization against a passive adversary that corrupts certain
number of agents in the network. The proposed protocol guar-
antees privacy of the affine parts of the honest agents’ costs
(agents that are not corrupted by the adversary) if the corrupted
agents do not form a vertex cut of the underlying communication
topology. Therefore, if the (passive) adversary corrupts at most
t arbitrary agents in the network then the proposed protocol
can preserve the privacy of the affine parts of the remaining
honest agents’ costs if the communication topology has (t + 1)-
connectivity. The proposed privacy protocol is a composition
of a privacy mechanism (we propose) with any (non-private)
distributed optimization algorithm.
Index Terms—privacy; distributed optimization
I. INTRODUCTION
A peer-to-peer distributed optimization algorithm refers to
joint optimization of the aggregate of agents’ costs in a peer-
to-peer network [1, 2, 3]. It has been shown that in certain
distributed optimization algorithms, an adversary (passive) can
learn about all the agents’ costs by corrupting a (non-trivial)
subset of agents in the network [4, 5, 6]. This is clearly
undesirable, especially in cases where agents’ costs carry
sensitive information, such as the economic dispatch problem
in power grids [7] or distributed statistical learning over private
data sets [8].
In this paper, we propose a distributed optimization protocol
that guarantees privacy of the affine parts of the honest agents’
(that are not corrupted by the adversary) costs against passive
adversaries that corrupt agents that do not constitute a vertex
cut of the underlying communication topology of the network.
Expectedly, this sufficient condition is coherent with the results
by Yan et al. [4]; the cost of an honest agent can be kept
private against a set of passively adversarial agents (agents
that are corrupted by a passive adversary) in the consensus-
based subgradient distributed optimization protocol if and only
if the honest agent has at least one honest agent as its neighbor
in the underlying commnication topology.
There exists differentially private (ref. [9]) distributed opti-
mization protocols [10, 11]. However, it should be noted that
in order to ensure differential privacy agents must compute a
random approximation of the optimal solution of the optimiza-
tion problem [10]. In this paper, we are interested in privacy
protocols that only prevents loss of privacy (defined later)
of honest agents’ costs due to the exchange of information
between agents during a distributed optimization protocol, and
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is not concerned with privacy loss due to the disclosure of the
final optimal solution.
Existing secure multiparty computation based methods,
for preserving privacy of honest agents’ costs in distributed
optimization algorithms, require the communication topology
to be complete [12, 13, 14], else they rely on secure mes-
sage transmission between agents to emulate the complete
communication topology [15]. The protocol proposed in this
paper is effective even when the communication topology is
not complete and only requires an agent to be aware of its
neighboring agents (and not the entire network). Homomor-
phic encryption based privacy approaches [16, 17] rely on
computational intractability of known hard problems, such
as the decisional composite residuosity problem or the RSA
problem. Thus, homomorphic encryption based techniques
are effective if the computational power of the adversary is
assumed bounded, which is true in practice, at least for now.
In this paper, we are interested in statistical (unconditional)
privacy that should hold regardless of the computational power
of the passive adversary. Specifically, in the proposed protocol
the adversary is unable to distinguish (quantified using KL-
divergence [18]) between any two possible set of costs of the
honest agents that yield the same optimal solution. However,
we note that homomorphic encryption based privacy methods
can also protect privacy of agents’ costs against an adversary
that is eavesdropping on the communication links between the
agents, unlike the protocol proposed in this paper.
Lou et al. [6] proposed a heterogeneous step-size consensus-
based subgradient algorithm to preserve the privacy of the
agents’ costs. However, [6] has shown convergence (to an op-
timal solution of the optimization problem) of their algorithm
only if the individual agents’ costs are convex. It is known that
individual agents’ costs need not be convex as long as their
aggregate is convex for a distributed optimization protocol to
converge to the optimal solution [21]. As a consequence of
this, the privacy protocol in this paper also does not rely on
the convexity of agents’ costs.
In a closely related work, Gade and Vaidya [5] have
proposed a similar privacy approach wherein each agent adds
correlated random functions to their original costs and use
these effective costs for solving the original optimization prob-
lem. The addition of correlated random functions preserves
the global aggregate cost and the privacy of honest agents’
costs is preserved as long as the adversarial agents that do
not constitute a vertex cut in the communication topology.
The privacy analysis in [5] uses the argument of compatibility
of honest agents’ costs in view of the adversarial agents.
Specifically, it is argued that every set of honest agents’ costs
that is compatible with the optimal solution could be the set
of honest agents’ costs as far as the adversarial agents (that do
not form a vertex cut) are concerned. However, this privacy
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2analysis does not consider the fact that probability distribution
of random functions that are added to the original costs
are also part of the adversary’s information, as adversarial
agents are also following the prescribed protocol, and creates a
discrepancy between the priori (before the execution of privacy
protocol) and posteriori (after the execution of the privacy
protocol) probability distribution of honest agents’ costs. In
this paper, the probability distribution of the random functions
that are added to the original costs is formally defined and
assumed known to the adversarial agents. Additionally, we
define a formal quantification of privacy (or loss of privacy)
of agents’ costs using the concept of indistinguishability based
on KL-divergence [22]. The defined privacy measure provides
an additional insight on the dependence of privacy of agents’
costs in peer-to-peer distributed optimization on the vertex
expansion (ref. [23, 24]) of the underlying communication
topology.
Privacy techniques based on algebraic transformations have
also been proposed recently, but only for privacy in multi-agent
optimization where all the agents communicate with a central
server to compute the solution of the optimization problem [17,
19, 20]. Most of these works are concerned about privacy in
linear programming, however there do exist some work for
privacy in a more general convex optimization problems [20].
In this paper, we are interested in the peer-to-peer distributed
optimization where agents only communicate with each other
to compute the solution of the optimization problem without
any central server.
A. Summary of Our Contribution
We present a general approach for achieving privacy in dis-
tributed optimization protocols with. Our approach constitutes
of two phases:
1) In the first phase, each agent shares correlated random
values with its neighbors and then computes a new,
‘effective cost’ based on its original cost and the random
values shared with its neighbors.
2) In the second phase, the agents run an arbitrary distributed
optimization protocol to optimize the aggregate of their
‘effective costs’, instead of their original costs, computed
in the first phase.
The first phase is designed to ensure that the aggregate of
all agents’ effective costs is identical to the aggregate of the
agents’ original costs. Therefore, the above two-phase ap-
proach does not affect the optimality of the obtained solution.
Furthermore, the privacy holds in our approach—in a formal
sense and under certain conditions, as discussed below—
regardless of the distributed optimization protocol used in
the second phase. To prove this we consider the worst-case
scenario where all the effective costs of the honest agents are
revealed to all the agents (including the adversarial agents) in
the second phase.
Speaking informally, the privacy guarantee is that the (col-
luding) adversarial agents learn very less (quantified later)
about the collective affine parts of the original costs of honest
agents from an execution of the protocol (described above)
other than the aggregate of the affine parts of the honest
agents’ costs. This holds regardless of any prior knowledge
the adversarial agents may have about the costs of (some of)
the honest agents. We prove that our protocol satisfies this
notion of privacy as long as the set of colluding passively
adversarial agents is not a vertex cut of the communication
topology.
The privacy mechanism in the first phase is similar in
structure to the privacy mechanism proposed in Gupta et
al. [22] for privacy in distributed average consensus.
II. NOTATION AND PRELIMINARIES
We let R, Rn and Rm×n denote the set real numbers,
n-dimensional real-valued vectors and m × n-dimensional
real-valued matrices. [m] = {1, . . . , m}. We use 1n to denote
the n-dimensional vector all of whose elements is 1. For
M ∈ Rn×n, we denote its generalized inverse by M† and
its pseudo-determinant1 by det∗(M). For any vector x ∈ Rn,
Diag(x) represents a diagonal matrix of dimension n × n
with the elements along the diagonal given by x.
We consider communication networks represented by sim-
ple, undirected graphs. That is, the communication links in a
network of n agents is modeled via a graph G = {V, E} where
the nodes V , {1, . . . , n} denote the agents, and there is an
edge {i, j} ∈ E iff there is a direct communication channel
between agents i and j. We let Ni denote the set of neighbors
of an agent i ∈ V , i.e., j ∈ Ni if and only if {i, j} ∈ E . (Note
that i 6∈ Ni since G is a simple graph.)
We say two agents i, j are connected if there is a path
from i to j; since we consider undirected graphs, this notion
is symmetric. A graph G is connected if every distinct pair of
nodes is connected; note that a single-node graph is connected.
Definition 1: (Vertex cut) A set of nodes S ⊂ V is a vertex
cut of a graph G = {V, E} if removing the nodes in S (and
the edges incident to those nodes) renders the resulting graph
unconnected. In this case, we say that S cuts V \ S.
A graph is k-connected if the smallest vertex cut of the
graph contains k nodes.
Let G = {V, E} be a graph. The subgraph induced by V ′ ⊂
V is the graph G′ = {V ′, E ′} where E ′ ⊂ E is the set of edges
entirely within V ′ (i.e., E ′ = {{i, j} ∈ E | i, j ∈ V ′}). We say
a graph G = {V, E} has c connected components if its vertex
set V can be partitioned into disjoint sets V1, . . . ,Vc such that
(1) G has no edges between Vi and Vj for i 6= j and (2) for
all i, the subgraph induced by Vi is connected. Clearly, if G
is connected then it has one connected component.
For a graph G = {V, E}, we define its incidence matrix
∇ ∈ {−1, 0, 1}|V|×|E| (see [25]) to be the matrix with |V|
rows and |E| columns in which
∇i, e =
 1 if e = {i, j} and i < j−1 if e = {i, j} and i > j
0 otherwise.
Note that 1Tn · ∇ = 0. We use ∇∗,e to denote the column of
∇ corresponding to the edge e ∈ E .
1Pseudo-determinant of a square real-valued matrix is equal to the product
of its non-zero eigenvalues.
3We rely on the following result [25, Theorem 8.3.1]:
Lemma 1: Let G be an n-node graph with incidence matrix
∇. Then rank(∇) = n−c, where c is the number of connected
components of G.
The graph-Laplacian L is given as L = ∇∇T . Let,
µ1 ≥ . . . ,≥ µn−c > 0 denote the non-zero eigenvalues of L.
(Eigenvalues of L are real values because L is a symmetric
real-valued matrix.) From Spectral theorem we can decompose
the graph-Laplacian L as following:
L = UDiag([µ1, . . . , µn−c, 0Tc ]T )UT
where, U ∈ Rn×n is a unitary matrix constituting of the
orthogonal eigenvectors of L. For convenience, we denote the
smallest non-zero eigenvalue of Laplacian L as µ(L)
The generalized inverse L† of the graph-Laplacian of G with
c connected components is given as following(cf. [26]):
L† = UDiag([1/µ1, . . . , 1/µn−c, 0Tc ]T )UT (1)
For a random variable (or vector) r, fr denotes its probabil-
ity density function (or distribution). Let E(r) denote its mean
value. The covariance (or variance) of r is denoted by Cov(r),
which is simply equal to E(rT r). The relative entropy of two
distributions fr and f ′r is given by the KL-divergence:
DKL(fr, f
′
r) =
∫
R
fr(s) log
fr(s)
f ′r(s)
ds
Here, R denotes the space of r.
A. Problem Formulation
We consider a network of n agents where the communica-
tion network between agents is represented by an undirected,
simple, connected graph G = {V, E}; that is, agents i and j
have a direct communication link between them iff {i, j} ∈ E .
The communication link between two agents is assumed to be
authenticated secure; equivalently, in our adversarial model
we do not consider an adversary who can eavesdrop on
communications between honest agents, or tamper with their
communication. (Alternately, private and authentic communi-
cation can be ensured using existing standard cryptographic
techniques.)
Each agent i holds a (private) cost hi : Rm → R. A dis-
tributed optimization algorithm is an interactive protocol that
enables agents in the peer-to-peer network to cooperatively
solve the following optimization problem
minimize
x∈Rm
∑
i
hi(x) (2)
We are interested in a distributed optimization protocol that
ensures privacy of agents’ costs against a passive adversary
that corrupts some fraction of the agents in the network. We let
C ⊂ V denote the set of agents corrupted by the adversary, and
let H = V \ C denote the remaining honest agents. As stated
earlier, we assume that the adversary is passive and thus runs
the prescribed optimization protocol. Privacy requires that the
entire view of the adversary—i.e., the costs of the corrupted
agents as well as their internal states and all the protocol
messages they received throughout execution of the protocol—
does not leak (significant) information about the original costs
of the honest agents. Note that, by definition, the adversary
learns
∑
i hi(x
∗) (assuming it corrupts at least one agent) from
which it can compute the sum of the costs of the honest agents
at x∗, and so ideally we require that the adversary does not
learn anything more about the honest agents’ costs than this.
We relax the above privacy requirement and only focus on
privacy of the affine parts of the agents’ costs. This privacy
requirement is formulated as follows.
Every cost hi(x), i ∈ V can be decomposed as
hi(x) = h
(na)
i (x) + h
(a)
i (x)
where, h(a)i (x) is affine in x (referred as the affine part of hi)
and h(na)i (x) is not affine in x. Specifically,
h
(a)
i (x) = α
T
i x, ∀x ∈ Rm
where, αi ∈ Rm. Note that we ignore the constants, as they
do not make any contribution in the optimization problem (2).
Let αki denote the k-th element of the affine coefficient
of agent i and αk = [αk1 , . . . , α
k
n]
T be the vector of k-
th elements of all the affine coefficients, for k ∈ [m]. Let
α = {αi}i∈V , then the distance between two sets of affine
coefficients α, α′ is simply the aggregate Euclidean distance
between their elements and is given by
dist(α, α′) =
√√√√ m∑
k=1
‖αk − α′k‖2
Our privacy definition is formulated for the privacy of
{αi}i∈H (affine coefficients of honest agents’ costs) against
C. Let αC = {αi}i∈C denote a set of affine coefficients of
corrupted agents’ costs, and αH = {αi}i∈H a set of affine
coefficients of honest agents’ costs.
Fixing some protocol, we let ViewC(α) be a random variable
denoting the view of the corrupted agents in an execution of
the protocol when all the agents begin with costs with affine
coefficients α. (Specific form of ViewC(α) is given later once
the privacy protocol is described.) Then:
Definition 2: A distributed optimization protocol is (C, )-
affine private if for all {αi}, {α′i} such that αC = α′C and∑
i∈H αi =
∑
i∈H α
′
i, the relative entropy of the distributions
of ViewC(α) and ViewC(α′) is bounded above by  > 0 as
DKL(ViewC(α), ViewC(α′)) ≤  dist(α, α′)2
(Here, following the similar notation α′ = [α′1, . . . , α
′
m].)
We remark that this definition makes sense even if |C| =
n−1, though in that case the definition is vacuous since αH =∑
i∈H αi and so revealing the sum of the honest agents’ costs
reveals the affine coefficients of honest agent’s cost!
In other words, the privacy definition above says that it is
very difficult for the adversary to distinguish between two pos-
sible sets of the collective affine coefficients of honest agents,
if the coefficients are close enough (closeness quantified by
distance defined above) to each other and has the same joint
aggregate.
4III. PRIVATE DISTRIBUTED OPTIMIZATION
As described previously, our protocol has a two-phase
structure. In the first phase, each agent i computes an “effective
cost” h˜i based on its original cost hi and random affine costs
it sends to its neighbors; this is done while ensuring that∑
i h˜i(x) is equal to
∑
i hi(x) for all x ∈ Rn (see below). In
the second phase, the agents use any distributed optimization
protocol Π to solve the following optimization problem
minimize
x∈Rm
∑
i
h˜i(x) (3)
This (as will be shown) gives the solution to the original
optimization problem (2). Also, in the first phase the effective
cost of each agent is obtained by adding an affine cost to the
original cost, thus h˜i is convex if hi is convex. Hence, most
of the existing distributed optimization (that assume individual
costs to be convex) can be used to solve (3).
It may at first seem strange that we can prove privacy of
our algorithm without knowing anything about the distributed
optimization protocol Π used in the second phase of our
algorithm. We do this by making a “worst-case” assumption
about Π, namely, that it simply reveals all the agents’ costs
to all the agents! Such an algorithm is, of course, not at all
private; for our purposes, however, this does not immediately
violate privacy because Π is run on the agents’ effective
costs {h˜i} rather than their true costs {hi}.
From now on, then, we let the view of the adversary consist
of the original costs of the corrupted agents, their internal
states and all the protocol messages they receive throughout
execution of the first phase of our protocol, and all the agents’
effective costs h˜ = [h˜1, . . . , h˜n]T obtained at the end of the
first phase. Our definition of privacy (cf. Definition 2) remains
unchanged.
The first phase of our protocol proceeds as follows:
1) Each agent i ∈ V chooses independent vectors rij ∼
N(0m, σ
2Diag(1m)) from Rm for all j ∈ Ni, and sends
rij to agent j. Here, σ ∈ R.
2) Each agent i ∈ V computes a mask
ai =
∑
j∈Ni
(rji − rij), (4)
where ai ∈ Rm.
3) Each agent i ∈ V computes effective cost h˜i such that
h˜i(x) = hi(x) + a
T
i x, ∀x ∈ Rm. (5)
Note that∑
i
h˜i(x) =
∑
i
hi(x) +
∑
i
aTi x
Moreover,∑
i
ai =
∑
i
∑
j∈Ni
(rji − rij) = 0
since G is undirected. Thus, ∑i h˜i ≡ ∑i hi and hence
correctness of our overall algorithm (i.e., including the second
phase) follows. Also, as mentioned earlier the new effective
costs are still convex if the original costs are convex.
Now, the effective affine coefficients of agent are given by
{α˜i}, where α˜i = αi + ai, ∀i ∈ V . As the view of the
adversary consists of all the effective costs {h˜i}, therefore
from the above privacy protocol we can infer that the privacy
of {hi}i∈H depends on the privacy of {αi} given the values
of {α˜i}.
Our algorithm is illustrated by example in Section IV.
A. Privacy Analysis
We show here that (C, )-affine privacy holds as long as C
is not a vertex cut of G.
For an edge e = {i, j} in the graph with i < j, define
be = rji − rij .
Let bk = [bke1 , . . .]
T be the vector of the k-th elements of
all such vectors be for all the edges in G. If we let ak =
[ak1 , . . . , a
k
n]
T denote vector consisting of k-th elements of the
masks used by the agents, then we have
ak = ∇ · bk.
Since the vectors rij are identical and independent with
normal distribution N(0m,Σ), it is easy to see that the
values {bke}e∈E are independent and have identical normal
distribution N(0,
√
2σ) in R. Thus, ak is normally distributed
over Rn with mean value and covariance matrix equal to
0n and 2σ2L, respectively for all k ∈ [m]. Specifically, the
probability density of ak at any point a ∈ Rn is given as
fak(a) =
1√
det∗(4piσ2L) exp
(
− 1
4σ2
aTL†a
)
(6)
where, det∗(4piσ2L) = (4piσ2)n−c∏n−ci=1 µi (product of non-
zero eigenvalues). As rank(L) = n− 1 when G is connected,
we have:
Lemma 2: If G is connected then ak is normally distributed
over all points in Rn subject to the constraint that
∑
i a
k
i = 0
for all k ∈ [m], with mean value E(ak) = 0n and covariance
Cov(ak) = 2σ2L.
Since α˜i = αi + ai, we have.
Lemma 3: If G is connected then the k-th elements of the
effective affine coefficients α˜k = [α˜k1 , . . . , α˜
k
n]
T are normally
distributed in Rn subject to the constraint that
∑
i α˜
k
i =
∑
i α
k
i
for all k ∈ [m], with mean value E(α˜k) = αk = [αk1 , . . . , αkn]T
and covariance Cov(α˜k) = 2σ2L.
Proof: As α˜i = αi + ai,∀i ∈ V . Thus, α˜ki = αki + aki
for every i ∈ V and k ∈ [m]. (α˜ki and αki denote the k-th
elements of α˜i and αi, respectively.)
If we let α˜k = [α˜k1 , . . . , α˜
k
n]
T and αk = [αk1 , . . . , α
k
n]
T ,
then we can have α˜k = αk + ak. As ak is independent of
αk, then for connected G from Lemma 2 we conclude that∑
i α˜
k
i =
∑
i α
k
i , and α˜k is normally distributed under this
constraint with E(α˜k) = αk and Cov(α˜k) = 2σ2L.
Let fα˜|α denote the probability density function (or dis-
tribution) of the collective effective affine coefficients α˜ =
[α˜1, . . . , α˜n] given that the true affine coefficients are α =
[α1, . . . , αn]. Then, using Lemma 3, we get the following:
Theorem 1: If G is connected then
DKL(fα˜|α||fα˜|α′) ≤  dist(α, α′)2 (7)
5for any two sets of collective affine coefficients α =
[α1, . . . , αn] and α′ = [α′1, . . . , α
′
n] that satisfy the constraint∑
i αi =
∑
i α
′
i. Here,  = 1/(4σ
2µ(L)).
Proof: Throughout the proof, we assume that G is con-
nected.
As α˜k = αk + ak and the value of ak is independent of αk
for every k ∈ [m], thus
fα˜k|α(α˜
k) = fak(α˜
k − αk)
This implies (cf. Lemma 2),
log
fα˜k|α(α˜k)
fα˜k|α′(α˜k)
=
1
4σ2
×{
(α˜k − αk)TL†(αk − αk)− (α˜k − α′k)TL†(α˜k − α′k)}
By further simplifying the above, we get
log
fα˜k|α(α˜k)
fα˜k|α′(α˜k)
=
1
4σ2
(αk − α′k)TL†(2α˜k − αk − α′k)
For simplicity, we let a = α˜k − αk. Then,
DKL(fα˜k|α||fα˜k|α′) =
1
4σ2
∫
a∈Rn
(α− α′)TL†(2a+ α− α′)fak(a)da =
1
2σ2
(αk − α′k)TL†E(ak) + 1
4σ2
(αk − α′k)TL†(αk − α′k)
=
1
4σ2
(αk − α′k)TL†(αk − α′k)
As 1Tn (α
k − α′k) = 0n, i.e. αk − α′k is orthogonal to 1n and
rank(L) = n− 1, this implies
DKL(fα˜k|α||fα˜k|α′) ≤
‖αk − α′k‖2
4σ2µn−1
=
‖αk − α′k‖2
4σ2µ(L)
Note that different elements ak and ak
′
of the masks are
independent of each other, where k 6= k′ ∈ [m]. Therefore,
fα˜|α =
m∏
k=1
fα˜k|α and similarly, fα˜|α′ =
m∏
k=1
fα˜k|α′
Hence,
DKL(fα˜|α||fα˜|α′) =
m∑
k=1
DKL(fα˜k|α||fα˜k|α′) ≤
dist(α, α′)2
4σ2µ(L)
The above implies (C, ) - affine privacy of the proposed
distributed optimization algorithm for the case when C = ∅,
i.e., when there are no corrupted agents. In that case, the
view of the adversary consists only of the effective affine
coefficients α˜, and Lemma 3 shows that the distribution of
those values depends only on the sum of the agents’ true affine
coefficients. Below, we extend this line of argument to the case
of nonempty C.
Fix some set C of corrupted agents, and recall that H =
V \ C. Let EC denote the set of edges incident to C, and let
EH = E \ EC be the edges incident only to honest agents. We
refer to GH = {H, EH} as the honest graph and let LH denote
the graph-Laplacian of GH. Note that now the adversary’s view
contains (information that allows it to compute) {be}e∈EC in
addition to the honest agents’ affine coefficients {α˜i}i∈H.
The key observation enabling a proof of privacy is that the
values {bke}e∈EH are independent in R|H| even conditioned on
the values of {be}e∈EC , for every k ∈ [m]. Thus, owing to
Theorem 1, we get the following privacy guarantee:
Theorem 2: If C is not a vertex cut of G, then our proposed
distributed optimization protocol is (C, )-affine private, with
 = 1/(4σ2µ(LH)).
Proof: Throughout the proof assume that GH is con-
nected, as C does not cute H.
For given α = {αi}i∈V ,
ViewC(α) = {{α˜i}i∈H, {be}e∈EC}
Let, α˜H = {α˜i}i∈H and bEC = {be}e∈EC .
Consider two sets of affine coefficients α = {αi}i∈V and
α′ = {α′i}i∈V such that αi = α′i, ∀i ∈ C and
∑
i αi =
∑
i α
′
i.
Then from Theorem 1, we get
DKL(fα˜H|α||fα˜H|α′) ≤  dist(α, α′)2
where,  = 1/(4σ2µLH)) and µ(LH) is the smallest non-zero
eigenvalue of LH.
As {be}e∈EC are chosen independently of the affine coeffi-
cients α, the above implies,
DKL(ViewC(α)||ViewC(α′)) ≤  dist(α, α′)2
As a corollary, we have
Corollary 1: If G is (t + 1)-connected, then for any C
with |C| ≤ t our proposed distributed optimization protocol
is (C, )-affine private.
The value of  is a quantitative measure of privacy, and
smaller is the value of  higher is the privacy. As is shown
in Theorem 2,  is inversely proportional to the variance of
random values added to the affine coefficients, which is quite
intuitive. As the proposed privacy mechanism does not affect
the accuracy of the distributed optimization protocol, thus
we can choose value of σ appropriately for desirable privacy
measure.
Also, it is interesting to note that the value of  is inversely
proportional to the smallest non-zero eigenvalue of the Lapla-
cian of the graph LH. From Cheeger’s Theorem [27], we know
that
φ2GH
2
≤ µ(LH) ≤ 2φGH (8)
where, φGH is a non-negative real number that is known as the
vertex expansion of graph GH. Value of φGH roughly indicates
how close GH is to being not connected (specific form is
omitted here, interested reader can refer to [23, 24]). In short,
smaller is the value of φGH , lower is the vertex connectivity of
GH and vice-versa. The value of φGH is zero if and only if GH
is not connected. Thus, owing to the Cheeger’s inequality (8)
the value of  in Theorem 2 is bounded above as
 ≤ 1
2σ2φ2GH
This means that higher vertex expansion of the honest graph
GH implies better privacy.
6IV. ILLUSTRATION
To demonstrate our proposed distributed average consensus
protocol we consider a simple network of 3 agents with V =
{1, 2, 3} and E = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}}, as shown in Fig.
1.
Fig. 1. Arrows (in blue) show the flow of information over an edge.
Let h1(x) = (x − x1)2, h2(x) = (x − x2)2 and h3(x) =
(x− x3)2, where x ∈ R is the public variable and xi ∈ R, ∀i
are the private constants held by agents.
Let C = {3} and so, H = {1, 2}. If the agents use a
consensus-based gradient method [2] for distributed optimiza-
tion of the aggregate
∑
i hi(x) then the adversarial agent 3
acquires knowledge of x1 and x2 (using the received optimal
estimates of 1 and 2 at each time-step of the optimization
algorithm). Now, to prevent this loss of privacy, the agents
implement the proposed privacy protocol in the following
manner.
In first phase, the agents execute the following steps
1) As shown in Fig. 1, all pairs of adjacent agents i and
j exchange the respective values rij and rji (chosen
independently and following a normal distribution, with
mean 0 and variance σ = 1, in R) with each other.
Consider a particular instance where
r12 = 0.1, r21 = 0.5, r23 = 0.7, r32 = 0.4, r31 = 0.3
r13 = 0.8
2) The agents compute their respective masks,
a1 = (r21 − r12) + (r31 − r13) = −0.1
Similarly, a2 = −0.7 and a3 = 0.8. (One can verify that
(a1 + a2 + a3) = 0.)
3) The agents compute their respective effective costs,
h˜1(x) = (x− x1)2 − 0.1x = x2 − (2x1 + 0.1)x+ x21
Similarly, h˜2(x) = x2 − (2x2 + 0.7)x+ x22 and h˜3(x) =
x3 − (2x3 − 0.8)x+ x23.
After the first phase, each agent uses a (non-private) dis-
tributed optimization algorithm Π in the second phase to opti-
mize
∑
i h˜i (it can be easily to verified that
∑
i h˜i ≡
∑
i hi).
Here, as agent 3 does not cut the honest agents 1 and 2,
therefore agent can only determine 2x1 + 2x2 with certainty
and not the individual values of x1 and x2 (cf. Theorem 2).
Specifically, as σ = 1 and µ(LH) = 2
DKL(View{3}(2x1, 2x2)||View{3}(2x′1, 2x′2))
≤ 1
c
{(x1 − x′1)2 + (x2 − x′2)2}
for any two (x1, x2) and (x′1, x
′
2) that satisfy
x1 + x2 = x
′
1 + x
′
2
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we have proposed a protocol for protecting
privacy of the agents’ costs, in peer-to-peer distributed opti-
mization, against passive adversaries that corrupt some fraction
of agents in the network. The proposed protocol preserves the
privacy of the affine parts of the honest (not corrupted by
the adversary) agents’ costs if the corrupted agents do not
constitute a vertex cut of the network. The only information
that the adversary can get on the affine parts of the honest
agents’ costs is their aggregate. This implies that the proposed
protocol can guarantee privacy of the affine parts of the honest
agents’ costs against a passive adversary that corrupts at most t
agents if the communication network has (t+ 1)-connectivity.
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